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Agenda item 4
First global stocktake

First global stocktake

Proposal by the President

Draft decision -/CMA.5

Outcome of the first global stocktake

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement,

Recalling Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement, which provides that the Agreement, in enhancing the implementation of the Convention, including its objective, aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty,

Also recalling Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement, which provides that the Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances,

Further recalling, as provided in Article 14, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement, that the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall periodically take stock of the implementation of the Paris Agreement to assess the collective progress towards achieving the purpose of the Agreement and its long-term goals, and that it shall do so in a comprehensive and facilitative manner, considering mitigation, adaptation and the means of implementation and support, and in the light of equity and the best available science,

Recalling, as provided in Article 14, paragraph 3, of the Paris Agreement, that the outcome of the global stocktake shall inform Parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, their actions and support in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Agreement, as well as in enhancing international cooperation for climate action,

Also recalling decisions 19/CMA.1, 1/CMA.2, 1/CMA.3 and 1/CMA.4,

Underlining the critical role of multilateralism based on United Nations values and principles, including in the context of the implementation of the Convention and the Paris Agreement, and the importance of international cooperation for addressing global issues,

including climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty,

Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind and that Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, the right to health, the rights of Indigenous Peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity,

Recognizing the fundamental priority of safeguarding food security and ending hunger, and the particular vulnerabilities of food production systems to the adverse impacts of climate change,

Also recognizing the critical role of protecting, conserving and restoring water systems and water-related ecosystems in delivering climate adaptation benefits and co-benefits, while ensuring social and environmental safeguards,

Noting the importance of ensuring the integrity of all ecosystems, including in forests, the ocean, mountains and the cryosphere, and the protection of biodiversity, recognized by some cultures as Mother Earth, and *also noting* the importance of 'climate justice', when taking action to address climate change,

Underlining the urgent need to address, in a comprehensive and synergetic manner, the interlinked global crises of climate change and biodiversity loss in the broader context of achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, as well as the vital importance of protecting, conserving, restoring and sustainably using nature and ecosystems for effective and sustainable climate action,

I. Context and cross-cutting considerations

1. *Welcomes* that the Paris Agreement has driven near-universal climate action by setting goals and sending signals to the world regarding the urgency of responding to the climate crisis;

2. *Underlines* that, despite overall progress on mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation and support, Parties are not yet collectively on track towards achieving the purpose of the Paris Agreement and its long-term goals;

3. *Reaffirms* the Paris Agreement temperature goal of holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change;

4. *Underscores* that the impacts of climate change will be much lower at the temperature increase of 1.5 °C compared with 2 °C and *resolves* to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C;

5. *Expresses serious concern* that 2023 is set to be the warmest year on record and that impacts from climate change are rapidly accelerating, and *emphasizes* the need for urgent action and support to keep the 1.5 °C goal within reach and to address the climate crisis in this critical decade;

6. *Commits* to accelerate action in this critical decade on the basis of the best available science, reflecting equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the light of different national circumstances and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty;

7. *Underscores* Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement, which stipulates that the Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances;

8. *Emphasizes* that finance, capacity-building and technology transfer are critical enablers of climate action;

9. *Reaffirms* that sustainable and just solutions to the climate crisis must be founded on meaningful and effective social dialogue and participation of all stakeholders, including Indigenous Peoples, local communities and governments, women, and youth and children, and *notes* that the global transition to low emissions and climate-resilient development provides opportunities and challenges for sustainable development and poverty eradication;

10. *Underlines* that just transitions can support more robust and equitable mitigation outcomes, with tailored approaches addressing different contexts;

11. *Recognizes* the specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, as provided for in the Convention and the Paris Agreement;

12. *Welcomes* the conclusion of the first global stocktake and *expresses appreciation and gratitude* to those involved in the technical dialogue thereunder, and to the co-facilitators for preparing the synthesis report[1] and other outputs of the technical assessment component;

13. *Welcomes* the high-level events convened under the first global stocktake and *takes note* of the summary thereof;

14. *Welcomes* the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and *expresses appreciation and gratitude* to those involved in preparing the reports in the sixth assessment cycle for their excellent work and dedication to continuing their work during the extraordinary circumstances of the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic;

15. *Notes with alarm and serious concern* the following findings of the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change:

(a) That human activities, principally through emissions of greenhouse gases, have unequivocally caused global warming of about 1.1 °C;

(b) That human-caused climate change impacts are already being felt in every region across the globe, with those who have contributed the least to climate change being most vulnerable to the impacts, and, together with losses and damages, will increase with every increment of warming;

(c) That most observed adaptation responses are fragmented, incremental, sector-specific and unequally distributed across regions, and that, despite the progress made, significant adaptation gaps still exist across sectors and regions and will continue to grow under current levels of implementation;

16. *Notes* the following findings of the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change:

(a) That mitigation efforts embedded within the wider development context can increase the pace, depth and breadth of emissions reductions, as well as that policies that shift development pathways towards sustainability can broaden the portfolio of available mitigation responses and enable the pursuit of synergies with development objectives;

(b) That both adaptation and mitigation financing would need to increase manyfold, and that there is sufficient global capital to close the global investment gap but there are barriers to redirecting capital to climate action, and that Governments through public funding and clear signals to investors are key in reducing these barriers and investors, central banks and financial regulators can also play their part;

(c) That feasible, effective and low-cost mitigation options are already available in all sectors to keep 1.5 °C within reach in this critical decade with the necessary cooperation on technologies and support;

17. *Notes with concern* the pre-2020 gaps in both mitigation ambition and implementation by developed country Parties and that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change had

[1] FCCC/SB/2023/9.

earlier indicated that developed countries must reduce emissions by 25–40 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020, which was not achieved;

II. Collective progress towards achieving the purpose and long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, including under Article 2, paragraph 1(a–c), in the light of equity and the best available science, and informing Parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, action and support

A. Mitigation

18. *Acknowledges* that significant collective progress towards the Paris Agreement temperature goal has been made, from an expected global temperature increase of 4 °C according to some projections prior to the adoption of the Agreement to an increase in the range of 2.1–2.8 °C with the full implementation of the latest nationally determined contributions;

19. *Expresses appreciation* that all Parties have communicated nationally determined contributions that demonstrate progress towards achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal, most of which provided the information necessary to facilitate their clarity, transparency and understanding;

20. *Commends* the 68 Parties that have communicated long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies and *notes* that 87 per cent of the global economy in terms of share of gross domestic product is covered by targets for climate neutrality, carbon neutrality, greenhouse gas neutrality or net zero emissions, which provides the possibility of achieving a temperature increase below 2 °C when taking into account the full implementation of those strategies;

21. *Notes with concern* the findings in the latest version of the synthesis report on nationally determined contributions that implementation of current nationally determined contributions would reduce emissions on average by 2 per cent compared with the 2019 level by 2030 and that significantly greater emission reductions are required to align with global greenhouse gas emission trajectories in line with the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement and *recognizes* the urgent need to address this gap;

22. *Notes* the findings in the synthesis report on nationally determined contributions that greenhouse gas emission levels in 2030 are projected to be 5.3 per cent lower than in 2019 if all nationally determined contributions, including all conditional elements, are fully implemented and that enhanced financial resources, technology transfer and technical cooperation, and capacity-building support are needed to achieve this;

23. *Notes with concern* the findings of the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change that policies implemented by the end of 2020 are projected to result in higher global greenhouse gas emissions than those implied by the nationally determined contributions, indicating an implementation gap, and *resolves* to take action to urgently address this gap;

24. *Notes with significant concern* that, despite progress, global greenhouse gas emissions trajectories are not yet in line with the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement, and that there is a rapidly narrowing window for raising ambition and implementing existing commitments in order to achieve it;

25. *Expresses concern* that the carbon budget consistent with achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal is now small and being rapidly depleted and *acknowledges* that historical cumulative net carbon dioxide emissions already account for about four fifths of the total carbon budget for a 50 per cent probability of limiting global warming to 1.5 °C;

26. *Recognizes* the finding in the Synthesis Report of the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,[2] based on global modelled pathways and assumptions, that global greenhouse gas emissions are projected to peak between 2020 and at the latest before 2025 in global modelled pathways that limit warming to 1.5 °C with no or limited overshoot and in those that limit warming to 2 °C and assume immediate action, and *notes* that this does not imply peaking in all countries within this time frame, and that time frames for peaking may be shaped by sustainable development, poverty eradication needs and equity and be in line with different national circumstances, and *recognizes* that technology development and transfer on voluntary and mutually agreed terms, as well as capacity-building and financing, can support countries in this regard;

27. *Also recognizes* that limiting global warming to 1.5 °C with no or limited overshoot requires deep, rapid and sustained reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions of 43 per cent by 2030 and 60 per cent by 2035 relative to the 2019 level and reaching net zero carbon dioxide emissions by 2050;

28. *Further recognizes* the need for deep, rapid and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in line with 1.5 °C pathways and *calls on* Parties to contribute to the following global efforts, in a nationally determined manner, taking into account the Paris Agreement and their different national circumstances, pathways and approaches:

(a) Tripling renewable energy capacity globally and doubling the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements by 2030;

(b) Accelerating efforts towards the phase-down of unabated coal power;

(c) Accelerating efforts globally towards net zero emission energy systems, utilizing zero- and low-carbon fuels well before or by around mid-century;

(d) Transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly and equitable manner, accelerating action in this critical decade, so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science;

(e) Accelerating zero- and low-emission technologies, including, inter alia, renewables, nuclear, abatement and removal technologies such as carbon capture and utilization and storage, particularly in hard-to-abate sectors, and low-carbon hydrogen production;

(f) Accelerating and substantially reducing non-carbon-dioxide emissions globally, including in particular methane emissions by 2030;

(g) Accelerating the reduction of emissions from road transport on a range of pathways, including through development of infrastructure and rapid deployment of zero- and low-emission vehicles;

(h) Phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that do not address energy poverty or just transitions, as soon as possible;

29. *Recognizes* that transitional fuels can play a role in facilitating the energy transition while ensuring energy security;

30. *Welcomes* that over the past decade mitigation technologies have become increasingly available, and that the unit costs of several low-emission technologies have fallen continuously, notably wind power and solar power and storage, thanks to technological advancements, economies of scale, increased efficiency and streamlined manufacturing processes, while recognizing the need to increase the affordability and accessibility of such technologies;

[2] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2023. *Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Available at https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/.

31. *Emphasizes* the urgent need for accelerated implementation of domestic mitigation measures in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement, as well as the use of voluntary cooperation, referred to in Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement;

32. *Also emphasizes* the urgent need to strengthen integrated, holistic and balanced non-market approaches in accordance with Article 6, paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement, in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, in a coordinated and effective manner, including through mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology transfer and capacity-building, as appropriate;

33. *Further emphasizes* the importance of conserving, protecting and restoring nature and ecosystems towards achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal, including through enhanced efforts towards halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030, and other terrestrial and marine ecosystems acting as sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases and by conserving biodiversity, while ensuring social and environmental safeguards, in line with the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework;

34. *Notes* the need for enhanced support and investment, including through financial resources, technology transfer and capacity-building, for efforts towards halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030 in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, in accordance with Article 5 of the Paris Agreement, including through results-based payments for policy approaches and positive incentives for activities relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries; and alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests, while reaffirming the importance of incentivizing, as appropriate, non-carbon benefits associated with such approaches;

35. *Invites* Parties to preserve and restore oceans and coastal ecosystems and scale up, as appropriate, ocean-based mitigation action;

36. *Notes* the importance of transitioning to sustainable lifestyles and sustainable patterns of consumption and production in efforts to address climate change, including through circular economy approaches, and *encourages* efforts in this regard;

37. *Recalls* Article 3 and Article 4, paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 11, of the Paris Agreement and *requests* Parties that have not yet done so to revisit and strengthen the 2030 targets in their nationally determined contributions as necessary to align with the Paris Agreement temperature goal by the end of 2024, taking into account different national circumstances;

38. *Recalls* Article 4, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement, which provides that developed country Parties should continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets, and that developing country Parties should continue enhancing their mitigation efforts and are encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the light of different national circumstances;

39. *Reaffirms* the nationally determined nature of nationally determined contributions and Article 4, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement and *encourages* Parties to come forward in their next nationally determined contributions with ambitious, economy-wide emission reduction targets, covering all greenhouse gases, sectors and categories and aligned with limiting global warming to 1.5 °C, as informed by the latest science, in the light of different national circumstances;

40. *Notes* the importance of aligning nationally determined contributions with long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies, and *encourages* Parties to align their next nationally determined contributions with long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies;

41. *Notes* the capacity challenges of the least developed countries and small island developing States related to preparing and communicating nationally determined contributions;

42. *Urges* Parties that have not yet done so and *invites* all other Parties to communicate or revise, by the sixth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the

Parties to the Paris Agreement (November 2024), their long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies referred to in Article 4, paragraph 19, of the Paris Agreement towards just transitions to net zero emissions by or around mid-century, taking into account different national circumstances;

B. Adaptation

43. *Emphasizes* the importance of the global goal on adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change with a view to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate adaptation response in the context of the temperature goal referred to in Article 2 of the Paris Agreement;

44. *Recognizes* the increasing adaptation planning and implementation efforts being undertaken by Parties towards enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability, as set out in national adaptation plans, adaptation communications and nationally determined contributions, as appropriate, and *welcomes* that 51 Parties have submitted national adaptation plans and 62 Parties have submitted adaptation communications to date;

45. *Recognizes* the significant efforts of developing country Parties in formulating and implementing national adaptation plans, adaptation communications and nationally determined contributions, as appropriate, including through their domestic expenditure, as well as their increased efforts to align their national development plans;

46. *Also recognizes* the significant challenges developing country Parties face in accessing finance for implementing their national adaptation plans;

47. *Notes with appreciation* the contribution of relevant UNFCCC constituted bodies and institutional arrangements, including the Adaptation Committee, the Least Developed Countries Expert Group and the Nairobi work programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change, to the efforts referred to in paragraph 45 above;

48. *Notes* that there are gaps in implementation of, support for and collective assessment of the adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation, and that monitoring and evaluation of outcomes is critical for tracking the progress and improving the quality and awareness of adaptation action;

49. *Acknowledges* that establishing and improving national inventories of climate impacts over time and building accessible, user-driven climate services systems, including early warning systems, can strengthen the implementation of adaptation actions, and *recognizes* that one third of the world does not have access to early warning and climate information services, as well as the need to enhance coordination of activities by the systematic observation community;

50. *Recalls* the United Nations Secretary-General's call made on World Meteorological Day on 23 March 2022 to protect everyone on Earth through universal coverage of early warning systems against extreme weather and climate change by 2027 and *invites* development partners, international financial institutions and the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism to provide support for implementation of the Early Warnings for All initiative;

51. *Calls for* urgent, incremental, transformational and country-driven adaptation action based on different national circumstances;

52. *Recognizes* that climate change impacts are often transboundary in nature and may involve complex, cascading risks that require knowledge-sharing and international cooperation for addressing them;

53. *Emphasizes* that the magnitude and rate of climate change and associated risks depend strongly on near-term mitigation and adaptation actions, that long-term planning for and accelerated implementation of adaptation, particularly in this decade, are critical to closing adaptation gaps and create many opportunities, and that accelerated financial support for developing countries from developed countries and other sources is a critical enabler;

54. *Recognizes* the importance of the iterative adaptation cycle for building adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability and *notes* that the adaptation cycle is an iterative process, consisting of risk and impact assessment; planning; implementation; and monitoring, evaluation and learning, recognizing the importance of means of implementation and support for developing country Parties at each stage of the cycle;

55. *Encourages* the implementation of integrated, multi-sectoral solutions, such as land-use management, sustainable agriculture, resilient food systems, nature-based solutions and ecosystem-based approaches, and protecting, conserving and restoring nature and ecosystems, including forests, mountains and other terrestrial and marine and coastal ecosystems, which may offer economic, social and environmental benefits such as improved resilience and well-being, and that adaptation can contribute to mitigating impacts and losses, as part of a country-driven gender-responsive and participatory approach, building on the best available science as well as Indigenous Peoples' knowledge and local knowledge systems;

56. *Notes* that ecosystem-based approaches, including ocean-based adaptation and resilience measures, as well as in mountain regions, can reduce a range of climate change risks and provide multiple co-benefits;

57. *Recalls* that, as provided in Article 7, paragraphs 10–11, of the Paris Agreement, each Party should, as appropriate, submit and update an adaptation communication, and that the adaptation communication shall be, as appropriate, submitted and updated periodically, as a component of or in conjunction with other communications or documents, including a national adaptation plan, a nationally determined contribution as referred to in Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement and/or a national communication, and that Parties may, as appropriate, also submit and update their adaptation communication as a component of or in conjunction with the reports on impacts and adaptation as stipulated in Article 13, paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement;

58. *Also recalls* that the guidance on adaptation communications is to be reviewed in 2025;

59. *Calls on* Parties that have not yet done so to have in place their national adaptation plans, policies and planning processes by 2025 and to have progressed in implementing them by 2030;

60. *Requests* the secretariat to prepare a regular synthesis report on adaptation information provided by Parties in their biennial transparency reports, adaptation communications and nationally determined contributions;

61. *Stresses* the importance of global solidarity in undertaking adaptation efforts, including long-term transformational and incremental adaptation, towards reducing vulnerability and enhancing adaptive capacity and resilience, as well as the collective well-being of all people, the protection of livelihoods and economies, and the preservation and regeneration of nature, for current and future generations, in the context of the temperature goal referred to in Article 2 of the Paris Agreement, and that such efforts should be inclusive in terms of adaptation approaches and taking into account the best available science and the worldviews and values of Indigenous Peoples, to support achievement of the global goal on adaptation;

62. *Calls on* Parties to enhance their adaptation efforts in line with what is needed to achieve the goal in Article 2, paragraph 1(b), of the Paris Agreement and the global goal on adaptation, taking into account the framework for the global goal on adaptation referred to in decision -/CMA.5;[3]

63. *Urges* Parties and *invites* non-Party stakeholders to increase ambition and enhance adaptation action and support, in line with decision -/CMA.5,[4] in order to accelerate swift

[3] Draft decision entitled "Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation referred to in decision 7/CMA.3" proposed under agenda item 8(a) of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its fifth session.

[4] As footnote 3 above.

action at scale and at all levels, from local to global, in alignment with other global frameworks, towards the achievement of, inter alia, the following targets by 2030, and progressively beyond:

(a) Significantly reducing climate-induced water scarcity and enhancing climate resilience to water-related hazards towards a climate-resilient water supply, climate-resilient sanitation and access to safe and affordable potable water for all;

(b) Attaining climate-resilient food and agricultural production and supply and distribution of food, as well as increasing sustainable and regenerative production and equitable access to adequate food and nutrition for all;

(c) Attaining resilience against climate change related health impacts, promoting climate-resilient health services, and significantly reducing climate-related morbidity and mortality, particularly in the most vulnerable communities;

(d) Reducing climate impacts on ecosystems and biodiversity and accelerating the use of ecosystem-based adaptation and nature-based solutions, including through their management, enhancement, restoration and conservation and the protection of terrestrial, inland water, mountain, marine and coastal ecosystems;

(e) Increasing the resilience of infrastructure and human settlements to climate change impacts to ensure basic and continuous essential services for all, and minimizing climate-related impacts on infrastructure and human settlements;

(f) Substantially reducing the adverse effects of climate change on poverty eradication and livelihoods, in particular by promoting the use of adaptive social protection measures for all;

(g) Protecting cultural heritage from the impacts of climate-related risks by developing adaptive strategies for preserving cultural practices and heritage sites and by designing climate-resilient infrastructure, guided by traditional knowledge, Indigenous Peoples' knowledge and local knowledge systems;

64. *Affirms* that the framework for the global goal on adaptation includes the following targets in relation to the dimensions of the iterative adaptation cycle, recognizing the need to enhance adaptation action and support:

(a) Impact, vulnerability and risk assessment: by 2030 all Parties have conducted up-to-date assessments of climate hazards, climate change impacts and exposure to risks and vulnerabilities and have used the outcomes of these assessments to inform their formulation of national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies, and by 2027 all Parties have established multi-hazard early warning systems, climate information services for risk reduction and systematic observation to support improved climate-related data, information and services;

(b) Planning: by 2030 all Parties have in place country-driven, gender-responsive, participatory and fully transparent national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies, covering, as appropriate, ecosystems, sectors, people and vulnerable communities, and have mainstreamed adaptation in all relevant strategies and plans;

(c) Implementation: by 2030 all Parties have progressed in implementing their national adaptation plans, policies and strategies and, as a result, have reduced the social and economic impacts of the key climate hazards identified in the assessments referred to in paragraph 6 (a) above;

(d) Monitoring, evaluation and learning: by 2030 all Parties have designed, established and operationalized a system for monitoring, evaluation and learning for their national adaptation efforts and have built the required institutional capacity to fully implement the system;

65. *Also affirms* that efforts in relation to the targets referred to in paragraphs 63–64 above shall be made in a manner that is country-driven, voluntary and in accordance with national circumstances, take into account sustainable development and poverty eradication, and do not constitute a basis for comparison between Parties;

C. Means of implementation and support

1. Finance

66. *Recalls* Articles 2, 4 and 9, paragraphs 1–4, of the Paris Agreement;

67. *Highlights* the growing gap between the needs of developing country Parties, in particular those due to the increasing impacts of climate change compounded by difficult macroeconomic circumstances, and the support provided and mobilized for their efforts to implement their nationally determined contributions, highlighting that such needs are currently estimated at USD 5.8–5.9 trillion for the pre-2030 period;[5]

68. *Also highlights* that the adaptation finance needs of developing countries are estimated at USD 215–387 billion annually up until 2030, and that about USD 4.3 trillion per year needs to be invested in clean energy up until 2030, increasing thereafter to USD 5 trillion per year up until 2050, to be able to reach net zero emissions by 2050;[6]

69. *Notes* that scaling up new and additional grant-based, highly concessional finance, and non-debt instruments remains critical to supporting developing countries, particularly as they transition in a just and equitable manner, and *recognizes* that there is a positive connection between having sufficient fiscal space, and climate action and advancing on a pathway towards low emissions and climate-resilient development, building on existing institutions and mechanisms such as the Common Framework;

70. *Also recognizes* the role of the private sector and *highlights* the need to strengthen policy guidance, incentives, regulations and enabling conditions to reach the scale of investments required to achieve a global transition towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development and *encourages* Parties to continue enhancing their enabling environments;

71. *Recalls* that developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention and that other Parties are encouraged to provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily;

72. *Also recalls* that as part of a global effort developed country Parties should continue to take the lead in mobilizing climate finance from a wide variety of sources, instruments and channels, noting the significant role of public funds, through a variety of actions, including supporting country-driven strategies, and taking into account the needs and priorities of developing country Parties, and that such mobilization of climate finance should represent a progression beyond previous efforts;

73. *Reiterates* that support shall be provided to developing country Parties for the implementation of Article 4 of the Paris Agreement, in accordance with Articles 9–11 of the Paris Agreement, recognizing that enhanced support for developing country Parties will allow for higher ambition in their actions;

74. *Also reiterates* the urgency to support the implementation of the Paris Agreement in developing countries;

[5] Standing Committee on Finance. 2021. *First report on the determination of the needs of developing country Parties related to implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement*. Bonn: UNFCCC. Available at https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/workstreams/determination-of-the-needs-of-developing-country-parties/first-report-on-the-determination-of-the-needs-of-developing-country-parties-related-to-implementing.

[6] United Nations Environment Programme. 2023. *Adaptation Gap Report 2023: Underfinanced. Underprepared.* Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme. Available at http://www.unep.org/resources/adaptation-gap-report-2023; International Renewable Energy Agency. 2023. *World Energy Transitions Outlook 2023: 1.5°C Pathway.* Abu Dhabi: International Renewable Energy Agency. Available at https://www.irena.org/Publications/2023/Mar/World-Energy-Transitions-Outlook-2023; International Energy Agency. 2023. *World Energy Investment 2023*. Paris: International Energy Agency. Available at https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-investment-2023.

75. *Emphasizes* the ongoing challenges faced by many developing country Parties in accessing climate finance and encourages further efforts, including by the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, to simplify access to such finance, in particular for those developing country Parties that have significant capacity constraints, such as the least developed countries and small island developing States;

76. *Welcomes* recent progress made by developed countries in the provision and mobilization of climate finance and *notes* the increase in climate finance from developed countries in 2021 to USD 89.6 billion and the likelihood of meeting the goal in 2022, and *looks forward* to further information on the positive progress;

77. *Notes* the efforts of developed country Parties to make progress in at least doubling adaptation finance from 2019 levels by 2025;

78. *Welcomes* the pledges made by 31 contributors during the second replenishment of the Green Climate Fund, resulting in a nominal pledge of USD 12.833 billion to date, and *encourages* further pledges and contributions towards the second replenishment of the Fund, welcoming the progression over the previous replenishment;

79. *Welcomes* the pledges made to date for the operationalization of the funding arrangements, including the Fund, referred to in decisions -/CP.28[7] and -/CMA.5[8] amounting to USD 792 million, for the Adaptation Fund amounting to USD 187.74 million and the pledges to the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund amounting to USD 179.06 million, and *commends* the efforts of the President of the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-eighth session in this regard;

80. *Notes with deep regret* that the goal of developed country Parties to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation was not met in 2021, including owing to challenges in mobilizing finance from private sources, and *welcomes* the ongoing efforts of developed country Parties towards achieving the goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year;[9]

81. *Notes with concern* that the adaptation finance gap is widening, and that current levels of climate finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity-building for adaptation remain insufficient to respond to worsening climate change impacts in developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change;

82. *Recognizes* the importance of the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism and the Adaptation Fund in the climate finance architecture, *welcomes* the new pledges to the Fund made at this session, *urges* all contributors to fulfil their pledges in a timely manner and *invites* the contributors to ensure the sustainability of the resources of the Fund, including the share of proceeds;

83. *Strongly urges* the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism to make full use of their current replenishment, *calls on* multilateral development banks and other financial institutions to further scale up investments in climate action and *calls for* a continued increase in the scale, and effectiveness of, and simplified access to, climate finance, including in the form of grants and other highly concessional forms of finance;

[7] Decision entitled "Operationalization of the new funding arrangements, including a fund, for responding to loss and damage referred to in paragraphs 2–3 of decisions 2/CP.27 and 2/CMA.4" adopted under agenda item 8(g) of the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-eighth session.

[8] Decision entitled "Operationalization of the new funding arrangements, including a fund, for responding to loss and damage referred to in paragraphs 2–3 of decisions 2/CP.27 and 2/CMA.4" adopted under agenda item 10(g) of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its fifth session.

[9] See https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2631906/4eee299dac91ba9649638cbcfae754cb/231116-deu-can-bnrief-data.pdf.

84. *Notes* the diversity of definitions of climate finance in use by Parties and non-Party stakeholders in the context of aggregate accounting of and reporting on climate finance and *takes note* of decision -/CP.28;[10]

85. *Urges* developed country Parties to fully deliver, with urgency, on the USD 100 billion per year goal through to 2025, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, noting the significant role of public funds, and *calls on* developed country Parties to further enhance the coordination of their efforts to deliver on the goal;

86. *Recognizes* that adaptation finance will have to be significantly scaled up beyond the doubling as per decision 1/CMA.3, paragraph 18, to support the urgent and evolving need to accelerate adaptation and build resilience in developing countries, considering the need for public and grant-based resources for adaptation and exploring the potential of other sources, and *reiterates* the importance of support for progress in implementing developing countries' national adaptation plans by 2030;

87. *Welcomes* the operationalization of the funding arrangements, including the Fund, referred to in decisions -/CP.28[11] and -/CMA.5,[12] and the pledges of USD 792 million to the Fund and *commends* the efforts of the President of the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-eighth session in this regard;

88. *Urges* developed country Parties to continue to provide support and *encourages* other Parties to provide, or continue to provide support, on a voluntary basis, for activities to address loss and damage[13] in line with decisions -/CP.28[14] and -/CMA.5;[15]

89. *Invites* financial contributions with developed country Parties continuing to take the lead to provide financial resources for commencing the operationalization of the Fund referred to in decisions -/CP.28[16] and -/CMA.5;[17]

90. *Recognizes* the importance of making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development for the achievement of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement and that this goal is complementary to, and no substitute for, Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, which remains essential for achieving mitigation and adaptation goals in developing countries;

91. *Also recognizes* the need for further understanding of Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement, including its complementarity with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, and *notes* the limited progress towards making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development;

92. *Decides* to continue and strengthen the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue between Parties, relevant organizations and stakeholders to exchange views on and enhance understanding of the scope of Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement and its complementarity with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement referred to in decision 1/CMA.4 until 2025 and *takes note* of decision -/CMA.5;[18]

93. *Recognizes* the transition to a mode of work to enable the development of a draft negotiating text for the setting of the new collective quantified goal on climate finance for

[10] Draft decision entitled "Matters relating to the Standing Committee on Finance" proposed under agenda item 8(b) of the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-eighth session.

[11] As footnote 7 above.

[12] As footnote 8 above.

[13] This paragraph is without prejudice to any future funding arrangements, any positions of Parties in current or future negotiations, or understandings and interpretations of the Convention and the Paris Agreement.

[14] As footnote 7 above.

[15] As footnote 8 above.

[16] As footnote 7 above.

[17] As footnote 8 above.

[18] Decision entitled "Matters relating to the Standing Committee on Finance" adopted under agenda item 10(a) of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties at its fifth session.

consideration by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its sixth session;

94. *Also recognizes* that the deliberations related to the scale and elements of the new collective quantified goal on climate finance could take into consideration the urgent need to, inter alia, support implementation of current nationally determined contributions and national adaptation plans, increase ambition and accelerate action, taking into account the evolving needs of developing country Parties, and the potential for mobilizing finance from a wide variety of sources, instruments and channels, recognizing the interlinkages between the different elements of the new collective quantified goal on climate finance;

95. *Underscores* the importance of reforming the multilateral financial architecture, inter alia, multilateral development banks, *acknowledges* the updated vision statement by the World Bank to create a world free of poverty on a livable planet and by the multilateral development banks to strengthen collaboration for greater impact, and *calls on* their shareholders to expeditiously implement that vision and continue to significantly scale up the provision of climate finance in particular through grants and concessional instruments;

96. *Emphasizes* the role of governments, central banks, commercial banks, institutional investors and other financial actors with a view to improving the assessment and management of climate-related financial risks, ensuring or enhancing access to climate finance in all geographical regions and sectors, and accelerating the ongoing establishment of new and innovative sources of finance, including taxation, for implementing climate action and thus enabling the scaling down of harmful incentives;

97. *Decides* to establish the xx dialogue on implementing the global stocktake outcomes;

98. *Also decides* that the dialogue referred to in paragraph 97 above will be operationalized starting from the sixth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement and conclude at its tenth session (2028) and *requests* the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to develop the modalities for the work programme at its sixtieth session (June 2024) for consideration by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its sixth session;

99. *Decides* to convene a xx high-level ministerial dialogue at its sixth session on the urgent need to scale up adaptation finance, taking into account the adaptation-related outcomes of the global stocktake, and to ensure the mobilization by developed country Parties of the adaptation support pledged;

100. *Urges* developed country Parties to prepare a report on the doubling of the collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing country Parties from 2019 levels by 2025, in the context of achieving a balance between mitigation and adaptation in the provision of scaled-up financial resources, recalling Article 9, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement,[19] for consideration by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its sixth session;

2. Technology development and transfer

101. *Underlines* the fundamental role of technology development and transfer, endogenous technologies and innovation in facilitating urgent adaptation and mitigation action aligned with achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement and sustainable development;

102. *Welcomes* the progress of the Technology Mechanism, which is comprised of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network, including through its first joint work programme, for 2023–2027, in supporting technology development and transfer through policy recommendations, knowledge-sharing, capacity-building and technical assistance;

103. *Highlights* the persistent gaps and challenges in technology development and transfer and the uneven pace of adoption of climate technologies around the world and *urges* Parties to address these barriers and strengthen cooperative action, including with non-Party stakeholders, particularly with the private sector, to rapidly scale up the deployment of

[19] See decision 1/CMA.3, para. 18.

existing technologies, the fostering of innovation and the development and transfer of new technologies;

104. *Highlights* the importance of predictable, sustainable and adequate support for implementing the mandates of the Technology Mechanism and for supporting national designated entities and of the delivery on the Climate Technology Centre and Network resource mobilization and partnership strategy for 2023–2027 as referred to in decision -/CMA.5;[20]

105. *Encourages* the Technology Executive Committee, the Climate Technology Centre and Network and the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism to enhance the involvement of stakeholders as they take action to strengthen the linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism;

106. *Emphasizes* the importance of ensuring the availability of and access to enhanced financial and capacity-building support for developing countries, in particular the least developed countries and small island developing States, for implementing and scaling up prioritized technology measures, including those identified in technology needs assessments, technology action plans and long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies that align with national circumstances;

107. *Encourages* inclusive international cooperation on research, development and demonstration as well as innovation, including in hard-to-abate sectors, with a view to strengthening endogenous capacities and technologies and fostering national systems of innovation in line with the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change;

108. *Recognizes* that achieving the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement requires the rapid and scaled-up deployment and adoption of existing clean technologies and accelerated innovation, digital transformation and development, demonstration and dissemination of new and emerging technologies, as well as increased access to those technologies, supported by appropriate enabling frameworks and international cooperation;

109. *Notes* the Technology Mechanism initiative on artificial intelligence for climate action, the aim of which is to explore the role of artificial intelligence as a technological tool for advancing and scaling up transformative climate solutions for adaptation and mitigation action in developing countries, with a focus on the least developed countries and small island developing States, while also addressing the challenges and risks posed by artificial intelligence, as referred to in decision -/CMA.5;[21]

110. *Decides* to establish a technology implementation programme, supported by, inter alia, the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, to strengthen support for the implementation of technology priorities identified by developing countries, and to address the challenges identified in the first periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism,[22] and *invites* the Subsidiary Body for Implementation at its sixty-first session (November 2024) to take into account the technology implementation programme in its consideration of the Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer, with a view to recommending a draft decision on the matter for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its sixth session;

3. Capacity-building

111. *Underlines* the fundamental role of capacity building in taking urgent climate action aligned with the goals of the Paris Agreement and *appreciates* the contributions made in this regard under institutional arrangements under the Paris Agreement, such as the Paris Committee on Capacity-building;

112. *Welcomes* the progress made in capacity-building at individual, institutional, and systemic levels since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, including through the work under

[20] Decision entitled "Enhancing climate technology development and transfer to support the implementation of the Paris Agreement" adopted under agenda item 11 of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its fifth session.

[21] As footnote 8 above.

[22] See decision 20/CMA.4, para. 8.

the Paris Committee on Capacity-building, the Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency and the Action for Climate Empowerment agenda;

113. *Recognizes* best practices in capacity-building, notably multi-stakeholder engagement, enhancing ownership by beneficiary countries, and sharing experiences and lessons learned, particularly at the regional level;

114. *Acknowledges* that developing country Parties continue to have persistent gaps in capacity and urgent needs for effectively implementing the Paris Agreement, including related to skills development, institutional capacity for governance and coordination, technical assessment and modelling, strategic policy development and implementation and capacity retention and *recognizes* the urgent need to address these gaps and needs that are constraining effective implementation of the Paris Agreement;

115. *Encourages* enhanced coherence and cooperation in the provision of effective capacity-building support, including, but not limited to, by facilitating collaboration platforms and capitalizing on the exchange of knowledge, country-led shared experiences and best practices;

116. *Recognizes* the role of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform in strengthening the capacity of Indigenous Peoples and local communities to effectively engage in the intergovernmental process under the Paris Agreement and *calls on* Parties to meaningfully engage Indigenous Peoples and local communities in their climate policies and action;

117. *Requests* the Paris Committee on Capacity-building to identify, in coordination with Parties, other constituted bodies and programmes and relevant stakeholders, current activities for enhancing the capacity of developing countries to prepare and implement nationally determined contributions, and *also requests* the secretariat to facilitate the sharing of knowledge and good practices for the preparation and implementation of nationally determined contributions, including through workshops;

118. *Encourages* developing country Parties to identify their capacity-building support needs and to report thereon, as appropriate, in their biennial transparency reports as part of the information referred to in decision 18/CMA.1;

119. *Also encourages* the Paris Committee on Capacity-building to consider new activities, including those related to adaptation, Article 6 of the Paris Agreement and the enhanced transparency framework under the Paris Agreement in deciding on its future annual focus areas;

120. *Requests* the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism and the Adaptation Fund to further enhance support for capacity-building in developing countries and to provide updates thereon in their annual reports to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement and *encourages* Parties to further enhance support for capacity-building, including through international cooperation;

D. Loss and damage

121. *Recalls* Article 8 of the Paris Agreement, in which Parties recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and slow onset events, and the role of sustainable development in reducing the risk of loss and damage, and according to which Parties should enhance understanding, action and support, including through the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts, as appropriate, on a cooperative and facilitative basis with respect to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change;

122. *Recognizes* the importance of particularly vulnerable developing countries and segments of the population that are already vulnerable owing to geography, socioeconomic status, livelihood, gender, age, minority status, marginalization, displacement, or disability, as well as the ecosystems that they depend on, in responding to loss and damage associated with climate change impacts;

123. *Stresses* the importance of promoting coherence and complementarity in all aspects of action and support for averting, minimizing, and addressing loss and damage associated with climate change impacts;

124. *Recognizes* advancements in international efforts to avert, minimize and address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts, including extreme weather events and slow onset events, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, including the progress of work made under the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism and its expert groups, technical expert group and task force; the establishment of the Santiago network for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change and progress in its operationalization, including the selection of its host; progress in the areas referred to in Article 8, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement; and as a result of ongoing efforts to enhance understanding, action and support with respect to loss and damage associated with climate change impacts;

125. *Also recognizes* national efforts to respond to loss and damage associated with climate change impacts, including in relation to comprehensive risk management, anticipatory action and planning, recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction, actions to address the impacts of slow onset events policymaking and planning for displacement and planned relocation, and mechanisms for channelling funding, including at the local level and for those who are on the frontline of climate change, to support activities relevant to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with climate change impacts;

126. *Acknowledges* that climate change has already caused and will increasingly cause losses and damages and that, as temperatures rise, the impacts of climate and weather extremes, as well as slow onset events, will pose an ever-greater social, economic and environmental threat;

127. *Recognizes* that improved understanding of how to avoid and respond to the risk of low-likelihood or high-impact events or outcomes, such as abrupt changes and potential tipping points, as well as more knowledge, support, policy and action are needed to comprehensively manage risks of and respond to loss and damage associated with climate change impacts;

128. *Acknowledges* the significant gaps, including finance, that remain in responding to the increased scale and frequency of loss and damage, and the associated economic and non-economic losses;

129. *Expresses deep concern* regarding the significant economic and non-economic loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change for developing countries, resulting, inter alia, in reduced fiscal space and constraints in realizing the Sustainable Development Goals;

130. *Recognizes* the need for urgent and enhanced action and support for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with climate change impacts, including under the Warsaw International Mechanism, including its expert groups, technical expert group and task force and the Santiago network and as part of other relevant cooperation efforts;

131. *Calls on* Parties and relevant institutions to improve coherence and synergies between efforts pertaining to disaster risk reduction, humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction, and displacement, planned relocation and migration, in the context of climate change impacts, as well as actions to address slow onset events, in order to make progress in averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in a coherent and effective manner;

132. *Recalls* that, in the context of the enhanced transparency framework, each interested Party may provide, as appropriate, information related to enhancing understanding, action and support, on a cooperative and facilitative basis, to avert, minimize and address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts;

133. *Requests* the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism to prepare, building on the work of its expert groups, technical expert group and task force,

voluntary guidelines for enhancing the collection and management of data and information to inform the preparation of biennial transparency reports;

134. *Also requests* the secretariat to prepare on a regular basis a synthesis report, for consideration by the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism, on information on loss and damage provided by Parties in their biennial transparency reports and, as appropriate, in other national reports under the Paris Agreement, with a view to enhancing the availability of information on loss and damage, including for the purpose of monitoring progress in responding thereto at the national level;

135. *Encourages* interested developing country Parties to seek technical assistance through the Santiago network for undertaking the actions referred to in paragraph 130 above;

E. Response measures

136. *Recognizes* the importance of maximizing the positive and minimizing the negative economic and social impacts of the implementation of response measures;

137. *Recalls* Article 4, paragraph 15, of the Paris Agreement, which states that Parties shall take into consideration in the implementation of the Paris Agreement the concerns of Parties with economies most affected by the impacts of response measures, particularly developing country Parties;

138. *Recognizes* that significant efforts have been undertaken to assess and address the positive and negative socioeconomic impacts of response measures by Parties and non-Party stakeholders domestically and by the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures and its Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures under the six-year workplan of the forum and its Katowice Committee on Impacts;

139. *Notes with appreciation* the progress of the Katowice Committee on Impacts in supporting the work of the forum;

140. *Notes* that just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs, and economic diversification are key to maximizing the positive and minimizing the negative impacts of response measures and that strategies related to just transition and economic diversification should be implemented taking into account different national circumstances and contexts;

141. *Underscores* the social and economic opportunities and challenges that arise from the efforts to achieve the Paris Agreement temperature goal;

142. *Notes* that further efforts are needed to strengthen the work of the forum and its Katowice Committee on Impacts;

143. *Encourages* Parties to consider developing, in consultation with technical experts, practitioners and other stakeholders, as appropriate, methodologies and tools, including modelling tools, for assessing and analysing the impacts of the implementation of response measures, with a view to minimizing the negative and maximizing the positive impacts of response measures, with a particular focus on the creation of decent work and quality jobs and on economic diversification;

144. *Also encourages* Parties to develop more national case studies involving the assessment and analysis of the impacts of the implementation of response measures to enable an exchange of experience among Parties on such studies;

145. *Further encourages* Parties, as appropriate, to establish capacity-building partnerships and networks for increasing the number of developing countries that are developing and using methodologies and tools for assessing the impacts of the implementation of response measures;

146. *Encourages* Parties, in their efforts to diversify their economies, to pursue relevant policies in a manner that promotes sustainable development and the eradication of poverty, taking into account national circumstances;

147. *Also encourages* Parties to provide detailed information, to the extent possible, on the assessment of the economic and social impacts of the implementation of response measures;

148. *Requests* the forum and its Katowice Committee on Impacts to intensify efforts to implement the recommendations outlined in relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, including by enhancing cooperation among Parties, stakeholders, external organizations, experts and institutions and by enabling the exchange of information, experience and best practices among Parties with a view to increasing their resilience to these impacts;

149. *Also requests* the forum and its Katowice Committee on Impacts in performing their functions to implement in line with the best available science and take into account different national circumstances;

150. *Notes* that the global transition to low-emissions and climate resilient development provides opportunities for and poses challenges to sustainable development, economic growth and eradication of poverty;

151. *Welcomes* the adoption of decision -/CMA.5[23] on the work programme on just transition pathways referred to in the relevant paragraphs of decision 1/CMA.4;

152. *Reconfirms* that the objective of the work programme on just transition pathways shall be the discussion of pathways to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement outlined in Article 2, paragraph 1, in the context of Article 2, paragraph 2;

III. International cooperation

153. *Reaffirms* its commitment to multilateralism, especially in the light of the progress made under the Paris Agreement and *resolves* to remain united in the pursuit of efforts to achieve the purpose and long-term goals of the Agreement;

154. *Recognizes* that Parties should cooperate on promoting a supportive and open international economic system aimed at achieving sustainable economic growth and development in all countries and thus enabling them to better to address the problems of climate change, noting that measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade;

155. *Notes* that the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change states that international cooperation is a critical enabler for achieving ambitious climate action and encouraging development and implementation of climate policies;

156. *Recognizes* the importance of international collaboration, including transboundary cooperation, for contributing to progress towards the goals of the Paris Agreement;

157. *Also recognizes* that international cooperation is critical for addressing climate change, in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, particularly for those who have significant capacity constraints, and enhancing climate action across all actors of society, sectors and regions;

158. *Acknowledges* the important role and active engagement of non-Party stakeholders, particularly civil society, business, financial institutions, cities and subnational authorities, Indigenous Peoples, local communities, youth and research institutions, in supporting Parties and contributing to the significant collective progress towards the Paris Agreement temperature goal and in addressing and responding to climate change and enhancing ambition, including progress through other relevant intergovernmental processes;

[23] Draft decision entitled “Work programme on just transition pathways referred to in the relevant paragraphs of decision 1/CMA.4” proposed under agenda item 5 of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its fifth session.

159. *Welcomes* current international cooperative efforts and voluntary initiatives for enhancing climate action and support by Parties and non-Party stakeholders, including through the sharing of information, good practices, experiences, lessons learned, resources and solutions;

160. *Also welcomes* the leadership and efforts of the high-level champions in supporting the effective participation of non-Party stakeholders in the global stocktake;

161. *Urges* Parties and non-Party stakeholders to join efforts to accelerate delivery through inclusive, multilevel, gender-responsive and cooperative action;

162. *Encourages* international cooperation and the exchange of views and experience among non-Party stakeholders at the local, subnational, national and regional levels, including conducting joint research, personnel training, practical projects, technical exchanges, project investment and standards cooperation;

163. *Also encourages* Parties and non-Party stakeholders to enhance cooperation on the implementation of multilateral environmental conventions and agreements, particularly their work under the Rio Conventions, to facilitate the achievement of the purpose and long-terms goals of the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals in a synergistic and efficient manner;

IV. Guidance and way forward

164. *Recalls* Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Paris Agreement, which states that each Party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions that it intends to achieve, and that Parties shall pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions;

165. *Also recalls* Article 4, paragraph 9, of the Paris Agreement, which states that each Party shall communicate a nationally determined contribution every five years in accordance with decision 1/CP.21 and any relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement and be informed by the outcomes of the global stocktake;

166. *Further recalls* that pursuant to paragraph 25 of decision 1/CP.21, Parties shall submit to the secretariat their next nationally determined contributions at least 9 to 12 months in advance of the seventh session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (November 2025) with a view to facilitating the clarity, transparency and understanding of these contributions;

167. *Recalls* Article 3 and Article 4, paragraph 3, of the Paris Agreement, and reaffirms that each Party's successive nationally determined contribution will represent a progression beyond the Party's current nationally determined contribution and reflect its highest possible ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances;

168. *Also recalls* decision 4/CMA.1, paragraphs 7 and 13, which state that, in communicating their second and subsequent nationally determined contributions, Parties shall provide the information necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding contained in annex I to decision 4/CMA.1, as applicable to their nationally determined contributions, and that, in accounting for anthropogenic emissions and removals corresponding to their nationally determined contributions, Parties shall account for their nationally determined contributions in accordance with the guidance contained in annex II to decision 4/CMA.1;

169. *Further recalls* decision 4/CMA.1, paragraph 4(c) of its annex I, which notes that Parties shall provide information on how the preparation of their nationally determined contributions has been informed by the outcomes of the global stocktake;

170. *Encourages* Parties to communicate in 2025 their nationally determined contributions with an end date of 2035, pursuant to paragraph 2 of decision 6/CMA.3;

171. *Invites* all Parties to put in place new or intensify existing domestic arrangements for preparing and implementing their successive nationally determined contributions;

172. *Emphasizes* the critical role of the full implementation of the enhanced transparency framework under the Paris Agreement;

173. *Recalls* that Parties shall submit their first biennial transparency report and national inventory report, if submitted as a stand-alone report, at the latest by 31 December 2024 and *urges* Parties to make the necessary preparations for ensuring timely submission thereof;

174. *Also recalls* paragraph 7 of decision 18/CMA.1 and paragraph 73 of decision 1/CMA.4, which recognize the importance of the provision of increased support, in a timely, adequate and predictable manner, to developing country Parties for implementing the enhanced transparency framework under the Paris Agreement;

175. *Further recalls* Article 15, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement and recognizes the role of the Paris Agreement Implementation and Compliance Committee in facilitating implementation of and promoting compliance with the provisions of the Paris Agreement in a transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive manner that pays particular attention to the respective national capabilities and circumstances of Parties;

176. *Emphasizes* the importance of Action for Climate Empowerment for empowering all members of society to engage in climate action and for the consideration of the outcomes of the first global stocktake;

177. *Encourages* Parties to take into account the good practices and opportunities identified during the technical dialogue of the first global stocktake in enhancing their actions and support;

178. *Also encourages* Parties to implement climate policy and action that is gender-responsive, fully respects human rights, and empowers youth and children;

179. *Affirms* that consideration will be given to the outcome of the review of the enhanced Lima work programme on gender and its gender action plan, including to the application of this outcome mutatis mutandis in considering the outcomes of the first global stocktake;

180. *Welcomes* the outcomes of and the informal summary report on the 2023 ocean and climate change dialogue and encourages further strengthening of ocean-based action, as appropriate;

181. *Requests* the Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to hold an expert dialogue on mountains and climate change at its sixtieth session (June 2024);

182. *Also requests* the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, at its sixtieth session, to hold an expert dialogue on children and climate change to discuss the disproportionate impacts of climate change on children and relevant policy solutions in this regard, engaging relevant United Nations entities, international organizations and non-governmental organizations in this effort;

183. *Encourages* the scientific community to continue enhancing knowledge on and addressing knowledge gaps in adaptation and availability of information on climate change impacts, including for monitoring and progress, and to provide relevant and timely inputs to the second and subsequent global stocktakes;

184. *Invites* the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to consider how best to align its work with the second and subsequent global stocktakes and *also invites* the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to provide relevant and timely information for the next global stocktake;

185. *Encourages* the high-level champions, the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action and non-Party stakeholders, as appropriate, to consider the outcomes of the first global stocktake in their work on scaling-up and introducing new or strengthened voluntary efforts, initiatives and coalitions;

186. *Invites* the relevant work programmes and constituted bodies under or serving the Paris Agreement to integrate relevant outcomes of the first global stocktake in planning their future work, in line with their mandates;

187. *Requests* the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies to organize an annual global stocktake dialogue starting at their sixtieth sessions (June 2024) to facilitate the sharing of knowledge

and good practices on how the outcomes of the global stocktake are informing the preparation of Parties' next nationally determined contributions in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Paris Agreement and *also requests* the secretariat to prepare a report for consideration at its subsequent session;

188. *Encourages* the relevant operating entities of the Financial Mechanism and the constituted bodies under or serving the Paris Agreement to continue to provide, within their mandates, capacity-building support for the preparation and communication of the next nationally determined contributions;

189. *Invites* organizations in a position to do so and the secretariat, including through its regional collaboration centres, to provide capacity-building support for the preparation and communication of the next nationally determined contributions;

190. *Also invites* Parties to present their next nationally determined contributions at a special event to be held under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General;

191. *Decides* to launch, under the guidance of the Presidencies of the fifth, sixth and seventh sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, a set of activities ("Road map to Mission 1.5") to significantly enhance international cooperation and the international enabling environment to stimulate ambition in the next round of nationally determined contributions, with a view to enhancing action and implementation over this critical decade and keeping 1.5 °C within reach;

192. *Recalls* paragraph 15 of decision 19/CMA.1, and *decides* that consideration of refining the procedural and logistical elements of the overall global stocktake process on the basis of experience gained from the first global stocktake shall commence at the sixtieth sessions of the subsidiary bodies and conclude at the sixth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;

193. *Invites* Parties and non-Party stakeholders to submit via the submission portal[24] by 1 March 2024 information on experience and lessons learned in relation to conducting the first global stocktake and requests the secretariat to prepare a synthesis report on the submissions in time to inform the refinement referred to in paragraph 192 above;

194. *Decides* pursuant to paragraph 8 of decision 19/CMA.1 that the information collection and preparation component of the second global stocktake shall start at the eighth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (November 2026) and its consideration of outputs component will conclude at the tenth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;

195. *Takes note* of the estimated budgetary implications of the activities to be undertaken by the secretariat referred to in this decision;

196. *Requests* that the actions of the secretariat called for in this decision be undertaken subject to the availability of financial resources.

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[24] https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx.